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Abstract—With the rapid growth of the Internet-of-Things
(IoT), concerns about the security of IoT devices have become
prominent. Several vendors are producing IP-connected devices
for home and small office networks that often suffer from
flawed security designs and implementations. They also tend
to lack mechanisms for firmware updates or patches that can
help eliminate security vulnerabilities. Securing networks where
the presence of such vulnerable devices is given, requires a
brownfield approach: applying necessary protection measures
within the network so that potentially vulnerable devices can
coexist without endangering the security of other devices in the
same network. In this paper, we present IOT SENTINEL, a system
capable of automatically identifying the types of devices being
connected to an IoT network and enabling enforcement of rules
for constraining the communications of vulnerable devices so as
to minimize damage resulting from their compromise. We show
that IOT SENTINEL is effective in identifying device types and
has minimal performance overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) is an ongo-
ing megatrend in computing with recent forecasts suggesting
the number of IoT devices to reach 24 billion in 2020 [1].
More and more people install IP-enabled devices and house-
hold appliances in their homes in order to benefit from the
improved ability to be informed about and control relevant
features of their homes. Examples of emerging IoT systems
include automated heating and air conditioning, security sys-
tems and home surveillance, lighting or traditional household
appliances with added WiFi-connectivity. Also entirely new
device classes utilizing network connectivity are emerging.
Numerous device vendors are providing such connected
products to users. Many of these firms are traditional house-
hold appliance manufacturers and do not necessarily have
expertise in engineering systems with computer security in
mind. As a result, there are many reports in the media about
IoT devices being deployed in users’ homes with security
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers (e.g., [2], [3]).
There have been reports of a single software flaw affecting a
full range of different products, as software components are
reused for different device models, thereby placing thousands
of Internet-connected IoT devices susceptible for attack [4].
Recent reports also suggest that a considerable number of
deployed devices use publicly known private keys [5], thus
making them vulnerable to unauthorized access by external
adversaries.
Using vulnerabilities in insecure devices, adversaries can
mount attacks against the user’s home network. The preferred
solution for dealing with device vulnerabilities would be to
patch them in order to eliminate weaknesses. However, all too
often device vendors are either unable (many users do not
register their devices with the device vendor) or unwilling to
provide such patches in a timely manner. Most IoT users do
not have the skills or willingness to perform such tasks or
they even forget unattended IoT devices previously installed
in their network leaving them with outdated software versions.
Future security solutions for IoT will need to take into
account that IoT devices with unpatched vulnerabilities may
often be present in the user’s network and co-exist with
other devices during their whole device lifetime. The pres-
ence of insecure, unpatched legacy IoT devices mandates to
accommodate a brownfield development approach for security
designs: the security mechanisms must be able to co-exist with
potentially insecure devices and software that users already
have deployed or will deploy in their home networks.
Goals and Contributions. In this paper, we tackle this
problem by presenting IOT SENTINEL, a system capable of
identifying the types of devices introduced to a network
and enforcing mitigation measures for device-types that have
potential security vulnerabilities. IOT SENTINEL does so by
controlling the traffic flows of vulnerable devices in order to
protect other devices in the network from threats and prevent
data leakage.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We present the design of IOT SENTINEL, a security
system (Sect. III) for managing the security and privacy
risks posed by inherently insecure IoT devices deployed
in users’ networks.
• We introduce a device-type identification technique tai-
lored for IP-enabled IoT devices (Sect. IV). Device-
type identification, in conjunction with information from
vulnerability databases can pinpoint vulnerable devices in
a network.
• We demonstrate the accuracy and scalability of IOT
SENTINEL device-type identification using a large set of
different real-world off-the-shelf IoT devices (Sect. VI).
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• We present a framework for confining traffic flows of
devices identified as vulnerable. The framework uses
software-defined networking to implement network iso-
lation and traffic filtering. We also show that the en-
forcement framework can be efficiently implemented with
moderate impact on traffic latency (Sect. V).
II. ADVERSARY MODEL
IOT SENTINEL is targeted at a typical network setup found
in homes and small offices, where devices are connected to
a gateway router offering wireless and wired interfaces for
connecting IP-enabled devices to the network. We assume that
when IoT devices are initially connected to the target network
they possibly have security vulnerabilities but are initially
benign, i.e., uncompromised by the adversary. The adversary’s
goal is to exploit IoT devices to either a) exfiltrate data,
security credentials or encryption keys, b) compromise other
IoT devices in the network with the help of a compromised
device, or, c) inject false or tampered information into the
user’s network.
It has been demonstrated [6] that also remote attacks against
IoT devices are feasible, if devices like smartphones that
are infected with malware are used to locate vulnerable IoT
devices inside the user’s WiFi network and to open an attack
path for the remote attacker through “NAT hole punching”,
allowing the attacker to connect to the target device remotely
for executing the attack. This emphasizes the importance of the
gateway router for upholding the security of the IoT network.
The goal of IOT SENTINEL is to restrict communications in
the network so that the adversary is either not able to connect
to the vulnerable device to exploit vulnerabilities, unable to use
a compromised device to attack other devices in the network,
or, unable to exfiltrate data from compromised devices, thereby
effectively mitigating attacks or limiting their impact.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
To protect the network against adversaries, IOT SENTINEL
will 1) identify the device-types of new IoT devices introduced
into the network, 2) make a vulnerability assessment of a
device using its device-type, and, 3) constrain communication
capabilities of the device accordingly. In this paper we focus
on #1 and #3. The term device-type in this work is defined
to denote the combination of make, model and software
version of a particular device. Device-type identification in
IOT SENTINEL is based on monitoring the communication be-
haviour of devices during the setup process to generate device-
specific fingerprints which are mapped to device-types with the
help of a machine learning-based classification model. For a
given device-type, its potential vulnerability can be assessed
by consulting an external information source as we briefly
describe in Sect. III-B. Based on the vulnerability assessment,
IOT SENTINEL protects the target network by limiting network
communications of the vulnerable device accordingly. The
design of our solution, shown in Fig. 1, consists of two major
components: a Security Gateway located in the user’s local
WiFi interface eth0 interface
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Fig. 1. IOT SENTINEL system design
network and an IoT Security Service operated by an IoT
Security Service Provider (IoTSSP).
A. Security Gateway
The Security Gateway is a software-defined networking
(SDN) based traffic monitoring and control component acting
as a gateway router of a home or small office. Devices in the
local network connect to the Security Gateway either through
WiFi or an Ethernet connection. We envisage that Security
Gateway will be deployed either as a dedicated hardware
device, or, as a software module or firmware update for legacy
WiFi access points having sufficient computational resources
for running the Security Gateway functionality.
Wireless devices use WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) to obtain
device-specific credentials in the form of WPA2 Pre-Shared
Keys (PSK) for authenticating with the wireless interface of
the Security Gateway. This limits a local adversary’s ability to
impersonate other devices and eavesdrop on encrypted WiFi
traffic in case the adversary can successfully compromise a
device, as each device has a unique, device-specific PSK.
For devices that do not support WPS, Security Gateway will
provide a device-specific WPA2-PSK to be used in the setup
process for WiFi authentication.
The Security Gateway monitors and profiles the behaviour
of individual devices and sends device fingerprints to the IoT
Security Service for identification (Sect. IV-B) and vulnerabil-
ity assessment of individual devices. Based on this assessment,
the IoT Security Service returns an isolation level (Sect. V) to
be enforced by the Security Gateway on the device.
B. IoT Security Service
Based on device fingerprints provided by Security Gate-
ways, the IoTSSP uses machine learning-based classification
models to classify devices according to their device-type. Ini-
tially, ground truth information about device-types for training
the models needs to be gathered manually by dedicated labora-
tory experiments with IoT devices. Crowdsourcing approaches
could also be considered, in a similar way as anti-virus ven-
dors mutually share malware signatures to improve detection
accuracy. Contrary to traditional fingerprinting approaches
utilising distinctive characteristics of particular data fields in
protocol messages, our approach focuses on the behavioural
characteristics of devices as discussed in detail in Sect. IV.
This allows us to profile and classify devices without prior
knowledge about the syntax of messages or data field values
used by individual devices.
For each device-type in the training data, the IoTSSP
performs a vulnerability assessment. This assessment is based
on querying repositories like the CVE database [7] for vul-
nerability reports related to the device-type. The vulnerability
assessment can be augmented with automated penetration tests
or recently developped automated bug searches techniques for
IoT devices [8]. Crowdsourced information can also be used
by cross-correlating security incidents and related device-types
as reported by Security Gateways of affected networks. In case
vulnerabilities exist, isolation level restricted (cf. Sect V) is
assigned. If no vulnerabilities for the device-type are reported,
it is assigned the level trusted. Unknown devices will be
assigned the level strict.
Using the trained classifiers, the IoTSSP identifies the
device-types of any new devices by feeding their device
fingerprints to the classifier. Based on each device-type’s vul-
nerability assessment, the IoTSSP determines the appropriate
isolation level required for the device and notifies the Security
Gateway along with possible auxiliary information depending
on the prescribed isolation level. IoT Security Service does not
store any information about its Security Gateway clients, it just
receives fingerprints and returns an isolation level accordingly.
Security Gateway can anonymously request the IoT Security
Service through anonymization networks such as Tor [9] to
ensure privacy preservation.
C. Mitigation Strategies
To manage vulnerable devices, we apply the following miti-
gation strategies that aim at maintaining as much functionality
as possible while minimizing the risk of harm. The technical
implementation of mitigation measures is discussed in Sect. V.
1) Network Isolation: The target of network isolation is to
block a potentially vulnerable IoT device from communicating
with other devices so that it cannot mount attacks against
them. To this end, the Security Gateway divides the user’s
network into two virtual network overlays: an untrusted and a
trusted network. Vulnerable devices are placed in the untrusted
network and strictly isolated from other devices.
2) Traffic Filtering: The target of traffic filtering is to hinder
adversaries from communicating with vulnerable devices and
exploiting vulnerabilities or exfiltrating data. Traffic filtering
is performed by the Security Gateway and can be targeted at
particular protocols or endpoints so that the functionality of
the vulnerable device is affected as little as possible.
3) User Notification: In some cases, network isolation
and traffic filtering are not sufficient to provide adequate
protection, e.g., if a vulnerable IoT device is equipped with
an external communication channel like Bluetooth or an LTE
data connection that cannot be controlled by the Security
Gateway. Since a compromised device could use this channel
for exfiltrating sensitive data, the only effective measure for
securing the user’s network is to manually remove devices at
risk. We therefore envisage a mechanism by which the system
notifies the user about devices with insurmountable security
flaws, helps her to identify the device in question and make
sure that it really is removed from the user’s network.
IV. IOT DEVICE IDENTIFICATION
As we discuss in more detail in Sect. VII-B, existing device
identification approaches based on wireless communication
fingerprinting have drawbacks that limit their usability in our
scenario. Some approaches focus on identifying particular
hardware or driver-specific characteristics (e.g., [10]–[13]),
which is not sufficiently distinctive, as the same hardware
components and drivers may be deployed in a wide variety
of different device types. Other approaches utilize unique
hardware-specific characteristics like clock skew to identify
unique network interface cards (e.g., [14]–[18]). This is,
however, too specific for our use, as we do not wish to identify
individual device instances, but rather identify the device-type,
i.e., the combination of make, model and software version of
each new device introduced into the target network. The few
techniques [19], [20] addressing device-type identification are
designed for high-end devices generating a large amount of
network traffic over a long period of time. However, smart
home IoT devices generate few network traffic in a discon-
tinuous manner, which makes these techniques inapplicable in
our scenario.
In this section we therefore introduce fingerprints specif-
ically designed to discriminate smart home device-types. A
two-fold classification system fed with these fingerprints deter-
mines the type of unknown devices. The system is tailored for
IoT scenarios being able to scale and adapt with minimal cost
to a large and variable set of device-types. It is primarily aimed
at devices communicating over WiFi but is also applicable to
any communications channel supporting TCP/IP.
A. Device Fingerprint
Our fingerprint is based on passively observed network
traffic. It leverages the specificity of smart home devices that
need to be inducted into the home network and associated to
the gateway by following a device/vendor specific procedure.
This procedure is characterized by a distinguishable sequence
of communications initiated by the inducted device, which our
fingerprint attempts to capture. When a new device identified
by a newly observed MAC address starts communicating with
the gateway, the latter records n packets {p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn}
received from it during its setup phase. The end of the setup
phase can be automatically identified by a decrease in the
rate of packets sent. We extract 23 features, giving a vector
representation for each packet pi = {f1,i, f2,i, f3,i, . . . , f23,i}
where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, a device fingerprint is a 23× n
matrix F with each column representing a packet received
with order i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and each row representing a packet
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE 23 PACKET FEATURES. FEATURES ARE BINARY
EXCEPT THOSE MARKED WITH “(INT)”, WHICH ARE INTEGER.
Type Features
Link layer protocol (2) ARP / LLC
Network layer protocol (4) IP / ICMP / ICMPv6 / EAPoL
Transport layer protocol (2) TCP / UDP
Application layer protocol (8) HTTP / HTTPS / DHCP / BOOTP /SSDP / DNS / MDNS / NTP
IP options (2) Padding / RouterAlert
Packet content (2) Size (int) / Raw data
IP address (1) Destination IP counter (int)
Port class (2) Source (int) / Destination (int)
feature, see Eq. (1). Consecutive identical packets from our
feature set perspective (i.e. pi = pi+1) are discarded from F.
F =
p1 p2 p3 . . . pn

f1,1 f1,2 f1,3 . . . f1,n
f2,1 f2,2 f2,2 . . . f2,n
f3,1 f3,2 f3,3 . . . f3,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
f23,1 f23,2 f23,3 . . . f23,n
(1)
Features used for packet representation are presented in
Table I, none of them rely on packet payload, ensuring
that fingerprints can be extracted from encrypted traffic. A
first set is composed of binary features set to 1 if some
selected communication protocols are used. These 16 protocols
were chosen because they are typically used during device
association over WiFi. Two binary features represent the use
of IP header options padding and router alert. The size of the
packet (in Bytes) and the presence of raw data is captured.
The destination IP address, if any, is mapped to a counter
starting from 1 and incremented each time a new destination
IP address is observed. This feature denotes the count and
order in which a device communicates with different entities
during its setup procedure. The two last features represent the
source and destination ports used, if any, mapped to network
port class:
• no port ⇒ f = 0
• well-known port [0, 1023]⇒ f = 1
• registered port [1024, 49151]⇒ f = 2
• dynamic port [49152, 65535]⇒ f = 3
Our fingerprints consider the temporal dimension of com-
munication by capturing and keeping in its representation
the sequential order in which packets are sent by a device
p1 → pn. In contrast to techniques aggregating network traffic
statistics over a period of time [12], [21], this extraction
method raises some issues for comparison, since fingerprints
have variable size n. To cope with this limitations we build
a second fixed-size fingerprint F′. F′ is composed of the 12
first unique vector packets p from F concatenated to produce
a 276-dimensional feature vector (12 packets × 23 features):
F′ = {f1,1, f2,1, . . . , f23,1, f1,2, f2,2, . . . , f22,i, f23,i}
Preliminary analysis concluded that 12 packets was a good
trade-off for F′ length: long enough to distinguish device-types
and short enough to be fully filled with unique packets from
F. However, if F does not contain enough unique packets to
fill F′, a padding with 0 values is used to reach the size of
276 features. This produces a fixed size feature vector F′ that
can be used with standard machine learning techniques.
B. Device-Type Identification
In order to be scalable and applicable for an evolving
number of devices, we propose an identification technique
that is two-fold. A first operation consists of building a single
classifier for each device-type we have fingerprints for. Each
classifier provides a binary decision whether the input finger-
print matches the device-type or not. An unknown fingerprint
can be accepted by several classifiers and thus match several
device-types. In such cases, a second step discriminates the
multiple matches using an edit distance based metric. While
edit distance could be used alone to identify device-types, this
procedure is far more time consuming than classification as
we will see in Sect VI-B. The classification step can easily
apply to thousands of device-types, providing a limited set
of device-types to discriminate via edit distance, ensuring the
speed and scalability of the approach.
1) Fingerprint Classification: The device classification is
operated using the fixed length fingerprints F′. Let’s as-
sume we have a set of fingerprints S for several device-
types. We select the subset of n fingerprints SDi =
{F′1,i,F′2,i, . . . ,F′n,i} for the device-type Di. The remaining
fingerprints of the set are for device-types Dx 6= Di. These
fingerprints belong to the complement of SDi in S: S
c
Di
. A
classifier Ci is trained for identifying the device-type Di, using
all samples from SDi as one class and a subset of samples from
ScDi as the other class. Only a subset from S
c
Di
is selected for
classifier training in order to avoid imbalanced class learning
issues [22]. Ci is then able to identify an unknown fingerprint
as belonging to the type Di or not. This process is repeated
for each device-type in S in order to build one classifier per
device-type. We use Random Forest classification algorithm
[23] to build these models.
Using this approach, every time the fingerprint of a new
device-type is captured, a new classifier is trained without
making any modification to the existing classifiers, avoiding a
costly relearning process. This “one classifier per device-type”
approach also enables the discovery of new devices since it
does not force any fingerprint to belong to one learned class
of a multi-class classifier. A fingerprint can be rejected by all
classifiers and thus be identified as a new device-type.
2) Edit Distance Discrimination: If an unknown fingerprint
F′ matches several device-types during the classification pro-
cess, the corresponding full fingerprint F is compared to a
subset of fingerprints from each device-type it got a match for.
The fingerprint comparison is done by computing Damerau-
Levenshtein edit distance [24] considering the insertion, dele-
tion, substitution and immediate transposition of characters.
We consider the matrix F as a word with each character being
a column of the matrix, i.e. a packet pi. Character equality for
edit distance computation is considered if all features f from a
Fig. 2. Sample enforcement rule. Rules are specified for single devices
using their MAC addresses. If the device isolation level is Restricted, a list of
permitted IP addresses is given through which the device can communicate
with its cloud service. The hash value is used for enforcement rule storage in
cache.
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Fig. 3. After fingerprinting and device-type identification, new devices are
assigned to isolation level strict, restricted or trusted.
packet pi are equal to those of another packet pj . The obtained
absolute distance between two fingerprints is divided by the
length of the longest one to provide a normalized distance
value bounded on [0, 1].
The distance is computed between the fingerprint to identify
F and a subset of five fingerprints from each device-type Di it
got a match for. Distances are summed up per device-type to
get a global dissimilarity score si ∈ [0, 5] of F with the type
Di. The lowest dissimilarity score si gives the final predicted
device-type for F.
V. ENFORCEMENT
Security Gateway uses Software-defined Networking (SDN)
to enable enforcement. We wrote a custom module for Flood-
light SDN controller [25] to perform network monitoring tasks,
fingerprint generation and to manage communications with
IoT Security Service. This module is also responsible for
generation and enforcement of restricted network access for
connected devices.
When a new device connects to the network, Security
Gateway generates a fingerprint from its network activity. This
fingerprint is sent to IoT Security Service, which identifies
the device-type, determines its required network isolation level
and returns it to the Security Gateway. There are three different
isolation levels for any device as shown in Fig. 3:
• Strict isolation level only allows the device to communi-
cate with other devices in the untrusted network overlay
with no Internet access for the device.
• Restricted isolation level allows the device to communi-
cate with other devices in the untrusted network overlay
as well as with a limited set of remote destinations on
the Internet (e.g., the vendor’s cloud service).
• Trusted isolation level allows the device to communicate
with any other device in the trusted network overlay and
unrestricted Internet access.
For the Restricted isolation level, the IoT Security Service
provides to Security Gateway an additional set of IP addresses
(or DNS names) with which communications are allowed.
Security Gateway stores the received information in local
cache. This information can be updated by regular update
queries to the IoT Security Service. Security Gateway uses this
information to generate enforcement rules to enforce device-
specific isolation level required in the network. We identify
traffic to/from any device using device MAC addresses, assum-
ing that IoT devices use static MAC addresses. Fig. 2 shows a
sample enforcement rule generated for a Device X identified
with MAC address 13-73-74-7E-A9-C2. The isolation level
for this device is Restricted. Therefore, the enforcement rule
contains a set of permitted IP addresses through which the
device can access its cloud services. These rules are enforced
in the network using Open vSwitch (OVS) [26] managed by
our customized SDN controller.
Network isolation at device level granularity ensures that no
vulnerable device, when compromised, is able to infect other
devices in the trusted network. Our custom module in the SDN
controller intercepts all traffic flows in the network and ensures
that they are filtered according to the required isolation level
assigned to the device by IoT Security Service.
Our implementation allows us to extend the traffic filtering
mechanism in Security Gateway to make network isolation
even more specific, up to the level of individual flows. Security
Gateway may require a large set of enforcement rules to
setup device specific security preferences in the network.
However, for any given flow, there is only one matching
enforcement rule. In order to minimize the latency experienced
during traffic filtering (i.e., time required to find matching
enforcement rule for a given flow), enforcement rules are
stored in a hash table structure to minimize the lookup time
as the enforcement rule cache grows.
Typically, the traffic between two wireless clients connected
to same AP is bridged between the clients and does not go to
the routing plane. Due to this limitation, the traffic cannot
be controlled using OVS. Some managed networks using
proprietary solutions, e.g., Cisco hardware and services, allow
network administrators to choose the way traffic is managed
on these wireless bridges. However, such functionality is
not available in typical consumer wireless APs deployed in
existing networks. To enable traffic filtering between wireless
devices on typical APs, we leverage Wireless isolation feature
available on modern wireless APs [27]. We use OpenWRT
and Linux drivers to redirect traffic between wireless clients
through OVS for identifying the devices connected to the
wireless interface. This allows us to manage device-to-device
communications and maintain required isolation between wire-
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Fig. 4. Lab setup for IoT device monitoring and mitigation enforcement.
less devices.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate the IoT device identification and enforcement
of mitigation measures, we developed a prototype system in
an IoT laboratory environment shown in Fig. 4 in order to
be able to simulate the IoT device setup process in typical
home and small office settings and test the performance of
the enforcement of mitigation measures. We collected traffic
measurements about the packets sent by each device during
the setup process and used the measurements in building the
classification model for IoT device identification as described
in Sect. IV.
A. Device Fingerprint Collection
Measurement collection for device fingerprinting was imple-
mented with a Linux Laptop running Kali Linux. The software
package hostapd was used to set up a WiFi access point
on the laptop emulating the WiFi interface on a WiFi AP.
Similarly, an external Ethernet interface was connected to the
laptop for emulating the Ethernet ports typically present on
APs. The packet capture module was implemented by using
tcpdump on the monitored WiFi and Ethernet interfaces so
that all network traffic visible to the Security Gateway on both
wireless and wired network interfaces could be recorded and
forwarded to the fingerprinting module. Data collection was
controlled by a scripted UI showing the test person performing
the device setup process the necessary step-by-step instructions
required to complete the connection of each device to the
network. The test scripts were manually compiled following
the printed or on-line user manual of each device. The setup
process of most of the examined IoT devices was facilitated
with a smartphone app or in a few cases a PC application. For
such devices, the corresponding app was installed on a testing
smartphone or laptop and used in the setup process according
to the provided instructions.
1) Tested devices: A representative set of IoT devices
targeted for regular consumers that were available in the
European market during Q1 2016 was selected for our exper-
iments. These covered most common device classes related to
smart lighting, home automation, security cameras, household
appliances and health monitoring devices. Most of the tested
devices were connected to the user’s network via WiFi or
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Fig. 5. Ratio of correct identification for 27 device-types
Ethernet, but some devices used other IoT protocols like
ZigBee or Z-Wave to connect to the network indirectly through
an Ethernet or WiFi hub device. For such devices, we focused
on monitoring the indirect traffic generated by the hub device
acting as a gateway towards the user’s network. An overview
of the tested devices is shown in Tab. II.
For each tested device, the typical device setup process
was repeated n = 20 times in order to generate sufficient
fingerprints for classification model training. After each testing
round, a hard reset of the tested device was performed to return
it to its default factory settings. Typically, a setup procedure
for a device involved activating the device, connecting to the
device directly over WiFi (the device sets up an ad-hoc WiFi
access point) or Ethernet with the help of a vendor-provided
app and transmitting WiFi credentials to the user’s network
over this connection to the device. After this, the device would
typically reset and connect to the user’s network using the
provided credentials. During this setup procedure, all network
traffic visible to the Security Gateway was recorded and pro-
vided to the fingerprinting module for further processing. The
fingerprints generated were then transferred to the IoT Security
Service for off-line training of the classification model. The
dataset collected from our evaluation setup is available on
request for research use.
B. IoT Device Identification
The fingerprints F and F′ were extracted from the traffic
captures following the technique introduced in Sect. IV-A to
obtain a dataset of 540 fingerprints representing 27 device-
types. The IoT device identification method was evaluated
through a stratified 10-fold cross-validation process using this
dataset. At each fold, we used the training data to learn
one classification model per device-type taking all the n
fingerprints F′ of the targeted type as one class and 10*n
randomly selected fingerprints F′ from the rest to represent the
other class. The testing data were subjected to the 27 learned
models to get a prediction from each. In case of positive
decision from several classifiers, edit distance discrimination
was performed using fingerprints F randomly selected from
the training data as described in Section IV-B. The cross-
validation was repeated 10 times to generalize the results.
The ratio of correct identification for each device-type is
TABLE II
LIST OF IOT DEVICES USED IN THE EVALUATION AND THEIR SUPPORTED CONNECTIVITY TECHNOLOGIES
Identifier Device Model W
iF
i
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ee
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et
Z-
W
av
e
O
th
er
Aria Fitbit Aria WiFi-enabled scale • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
HomeMaticPlug Homematic pluggable switch HMIP-PS ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •
Withings Withings Wireless Scale WS-30 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
MAXGateway MAX! Cube LAN Gateway for MAX! Home automation sensors ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
HueBridge Philips Hue Bridge model 3241312018 ◦ • • ◦ ◦
HueSwitch Philips Hue Light Switch PTM 215Z ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦
EdnetGateway Ednet.living Starter kit power Gateway • ◦ ◦ ◦ •
EdnetCam Ednet Wireless indoor IP camera Cube • ◦ • ◦ ◦
EdimaxCam Edimax IC-3115W Smart HD WiFi Network Camera • ◦ • ◦ ◦
Lightify Osram Lightify Gateway • • ◦ ◦ ◦
WeMoInsightSwitch WeMo Insight Switch model F7C029de • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
WeMoLink WeMo Link Lighting Bridge model F7C031vf • • ◦ ◦ ◦
WeMoSwitch WeMo Switch model F7C027de • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
D-LinkHomeHub D-Link Connected Home Hub DCH-G020 • ◦ • • ◦
D-LinkDoorSensor D-Link Door & Window sensor ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦
D-LinkDayCam D-Link WiFi Day Camera DCS-930L • ◦ • ◦ ◦
D-LinkCam D-Link HD IP Camera DCH-935L • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
D-LinkSwitch D-Link Smart plug DSP-W215 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
D-LinkWaterSensor D-Link Water sensor DCH-S160 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
D-LinkSiren D-Link Siren DCH-S220 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
D-LinkSensor D-Link WiFi Motion sensor DCH-S150 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
TP-LinkPlugHS110 TP-Link WiFi Smart plug HS110 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
TP-LinkPlugHS100 TP-Link WiFi Smart plug HS100 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
EdimaxPlug1101W Edimax SP-1101W Smart Plug Switch • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
EdimaxPlug2101W Edimax SP-2101W Smart Plug Switch • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
SmarterCoffee Smarter SmarterCoffee coffee machine SMC10-EU • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
iKettle2 Smarter iKettle 2.0 water kettle SMK20-EU • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
reported in Fig. 5. The accuracy of identification is over 0.95
for 17 devices, most of them reaching 1. However, we can see
that 10 devices are correctly identified with an accuracy around
0.5, which is lower but still good considering a random type
assignment that would give 1/27 = 0.037 accuracy. The global
ratio of correct identification over the 27 devices is 0.815.
To better understand why the 10 aforementioned devices got
identified with lower accuracy than others, Table III depicts
their confusion matrix. We can see that the misidentification
occurs between similar devices from same vendors, i.e., a set
of similar D-Link devices (1-4), two models of smart plugs
from TP-Link (5-6) and Edimax (7-8) and a coffee machine (9)
and water kettle (10) from the same vendor. In contrast, Fig. 5
shows that our identification technique is able to distinguish
devices from same vendor with different purposes, e.g., D-
Link camera, hub and sensors, WeMo devices, Edimax camera
and plug, etc. From a system point of view, the misidentified
devices are very similar: D-Link water sensor (2), siren (3)
and sensor (4) have identical hardware and firmware version,
as TP-Link plugs (5-6) do. Hence, these devices are likely
to share vulnerabilities, if any. Moreover, SmarterCoffee (9)
and iKettle2 (10) received a firmware update during the data
collection period that led to generate new fingerprints. These
fingerprints were distinguishable from the one generated with
their older firmware version. This suggests that our device
fingerprint is able to discriminate device-types as long as they
have different hardware/firmware versions, and vulnerability
patching would change the fingerprint of a device. Hence, this
specific misidentification issue is not a concern for our purpose
of identifying vulnerable devices.
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 10 DEVICES WITH LOW IDENTIFICATION RATE
(DEVICE INDEX FIND CORRESPONDING NAMES IN FIG. 5)
A= ACTUAL TYPE / P= PREDICTED TYPE
A\P 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 123 23 28 26 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 103 42 55 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 4 55 87 54 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 8 65 49 78 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 132 68 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 88 112 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 75 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 116 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 110
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 117 83
From a performance perspective, Tab. IV reports the time
taken for device-type identification. We see that most of
the time is spent on cases where discrimination using edit
distance was required. During experiments, 55% of the ana-
lyzed fingerprints matched more than one type and needed a
discrimination step that involved between two and five types.
On average, seven edit distance computations were needed
per device. The average time for device-type identification is
around 150 ms. For comparison, the time taken for device
setup was between one and two minutes, the packet collection
was performed in parallel of this operation. The classification
with Random Forest takes very little time (<1 ms) and grows
linearly with the number of types to identify. This shows
that IOT SENTINEL can easily scale to thousands of device-
types while keeping classification time below 100 ms and type
identification likely below 1 second.
TABLE IV
TIME CONSUMPTION FOR DEVICE-TYPE IDENTIFICATION. TIME FOR
SINGLE STEPS IS PRESENTED AT THE TOP AND TIME FOR AN AVERAGE
TYPE IDENTIFICATION IN OUR LAB SETUP IS PRESENTED BELOW.
Steps Mean (±StDev)
1 Classification (Random Forest) 0.014 ms (±0.003)
1 Discrimination (edit distance) 23.36 ms (±24.37)
Fingerprint extraction 0.850 ms (±0.698)
27 Classifications (Random Forest) 0.385 ms (±0.081)
7 Discriminations (edit distance) 156.5 ms (±170.6)
Type Identification 157.7 ms (±171.4)
C. Mitigation Measures Enforcement
Fig. 4 shows the lab setup used for testing enforcement
mechanism employed by Security Gateway. In general, Secu-
rity Gateway can be deployed in two setups.
• A Raspberry PI 2 (R-Pi II) device running both the
OVS and custom SDN controller acts as standalone
Security Gateway in the network. An external USB WiFi
dongle, or integrated WiFi and hostapd used to emulate
wireless interface on R-Pi II [28].
• An off-the-shelf router on which we setup OpenFlow en-
abled Access Point (OF-AP) by installing OVS software
package over the stock OpenWRT OS of the router [27].
In that case, the OVS on OF-AP will be managed by our
custom SDN controller running on a separate machine.
We selected the first setup for evaluation. For each exper-
iment, we performed 15 iterations for each measured device
pair. We measured the latency experienced between devices
D1 − Dn connected to Security Gateway wireless interface,
as well as between devices and servers, where Slocal is in
the local network and Sremote is a remote server deployed in
Amazon EC2. Table V shows that the enforcement mechanism
employed for traffic filtering by Security Gateway does not
impact the latency experienced by the user. Fig. 6a shows the
impact on latency experienced by devices regarding the total
number of concurrent flows in the network. The results show
that the increase in latency for up to 150 concurrent flows is
insignificant to affect user experience or device operations.
TABLE VI
OVERHEAD DUE TO FILTERING
MECHANISM.
Case OverheadMean (± StDev)
D1D2 Latency +5.84% (±4.76%)
D1D3 Latency +0.71% (±5.88%)
CPU utilization +0.63% (±1.8%)
Memory usage +7.6% (±4.6%)
We also measured the
memory and CPU
overhead of our
enforcement mechanism.
Fig. 6b shows that there
is very little overhead
in terms of CPU
utilization due to traffic
filtering mechanism. The
overall CPU utilization
measurements also shows that Security Gateway does not
require high processing power to perform network operations.
Similarly, Fig. 6c shows the amount of memory utilized by
Security Gateway with and without using filtering mechanism
is almost similar. The amount of memory used for storing
TABLE V
LATENCY (MS) EXPERIENCED BY USERS WHERE D1−D4 ARE USER
DEVICES CONNECTED TO SECURITY GATEWAY (SGW) AND Slocal AND
Sremote ARE SERVERS.
Source Destination Filtering
Mean (± StDev)
No Filtering
Mean (± StDev)
D1 D4 24.8 (±1.4) 24.5 (±1.4)
Slocal 18.4 (±1.3) 18.2 (±1.3)
Sremote 20.6 (±3.3) 20.3 (±3.1)
D2 D4 28.5 (±1.7) 28.2 (±1.6)
Slocal 17.2 (±1.2) 17.0 (±1.2)
Sremote 20.0 (±2.9) 19.8 (±3.1)
D3 D4 27.6 (±1.6) 27.5 (±1.6)
Slocal 15.5 (±1.2) 15.4 (±1.1)
Sremote 20.6 (±3.2) 19.9 (±3.2)
enforcement rules can be controlled by limiting the size of
enforcement rule cache and removing unused enforcement
rules (for the devices that are no longer connected to the
network) from the cache. The percentage increase in memory,
CPU utilization as well as latency experienced by user due to
filtering mechanism is given in Table VI. These results show
that the overhead on memory and CPU utilization is low. Fig. 6
also shows that a small form factor PC such as Raspberry
Pi II provides sufficient computational resources for a typical
environment hosting, e.g., a hundred IoT devices generating
the same number of concurrent flows and requiring as many
enforcement rules.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Securing IoT Device-to-Device Communications
Authentication schemes tailored for resource constrained
devices [29] are primarily used to control communications
between IoT devices. Zenger et al. [30] proposed a vicinity
based pairing mechanism that delegates trust from one node
to another based on physical proximity. Messaging between
devices can be authenticated using multiple communication
channels (e.g. Bluetooth + NFC) to ensure secure pairing [31].
However, these schemes require some implementation on all
devices of the system to be applicable, failing to cope with
the IoT brownfield of legacy devices already deployed.
At run time, communications between IoT devices can be
restricted based on high level user requirements that a system,
namely SIFT [32], translates to low level access control poli-
cies. Fully automated techniques to identify malicious commu-
nications rely on intrusion detection systems tailored for IoT
scenarios [33]. Verification of data sent from a given device
can be based on measurement correlation with other devices to
identify malicious nodes attempting to pollute measurements
[34]. Action can then be taken to discard communications from
this device. The main difference between IOT SENTINEL and
these techniques is that the former is preventive, mitigating
the threat of vulnerable devices when they are inducted in the
system and before any malicious communication is initiated.
A recently announced commercial product that follows a
similar conceptual approach as IOT SENTINEL is F-Secure
SENSE [35]. However, SENSE is focused on traditional pro-
tection technologies like anti-virus capabilities and blocking
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Fig. 6. IOT SENTINEL Performance evaluation for Raspberry PI based deployment of Security Gateway. There is only minimal increase in CPU
and memory utilization of Security Gateway with filtering mechanism enabled. Additionally, the increase in latency experienced relative to increasing number of
concurrent flows in the network is insignificant in terms of user experience.
of botnet controllers and malicious websites [36]. Unlike IOT
SENTINEL, it does not seem to provide means for automatic
identification of arbitrary IoT device-types.
B. Device Fingerprinting
Early work in 802.11 wireless communication fingerprinting
targeted the identification of hardware and driver specific
characteristics, with active [10] or passive methods [11]–
[13]. Cache [11] used 802.11 frames’ duration field that only
takes few discrete values depending on driver implementation
to identify WiFi drivers. Passively recording 802.11 probing
frames inter-arrival time from a device, Franklin et al. [12]
were able to classify 17 WiFi drivers with an accuracy ranging
between 77% and 96% using a Bayesian classification method.
While relying on passively captured network traffic as we
do, these techniques build hardware/driver specific fingerprints
that are too coarse-grained for our purpose of identifying
device-types. Low cost IoT devices are likely to use identical
cheap WiFi interfaces and corresponding drivers leading to
aggregate a wide range of device-types in the same class using
these techniques.
On the other hand, network features such as packet desti-
nation, SSID probes, broadcast packet size and MAC protocol
fields were used to fingerprint specific users in [21]. Hardware
specific characteristics such as clock skew [14]–[16] or radio-
frequency signature [17], [18] can be used to identify a unique
network interface card, mostly for rogue wireless Access Point
detection purposes. IoT-specific techniques target mostly high-
end devices, leveraging mobile device configuration [37], or
sensor specific features [38]–[40] though similar techniques
can be applied to larger classes of IoT devices [41], [42]. How-
ever, sensor data analysis only addresses the identification of
a limited class of devices actually reporting such information.
All these methods build fingerprints able to uniquely identify a
device, which is too specific to identify an unknown device as
belonging to one type. Our technique is positioned between the
former and latter approaches, providing the right granularity
to identify device-types from passive traffic captures.
Gao et al. [19] similarly introduced a passive technique to
identify device-types using the fact that a type of device mod-
ifies a packet in a unique way, due to its internal architecture,
while processing it. Capturing incoming and outgoing packets
and applying wavelet analysis, they were able to discriminate
device-types. This technique only applies to devices processing
and forwarding packets such as routing devices but is not
applicable to end point IoT devices that we target in our work.
GTID [20] addresses as well device-type identification.
GTID builds a feature vector composed of inter-arrival time
of packets sent by a device for a specific type of traffic
(e.g. Skype, ICMP, etc.). Feature vectors are used in a neural
network predicting as many classes as there are device-types
to identify. The main difference with our work is that our
fingerprints are not specific to a type of traffic sent at high
rate over a significant period of time. In contrast to devices
used for GTID evaluation, i.e., smartphones and tablets, most
IoT devices generate less traffic with less diversity limiting
this approach to high-end devices. Our technique has a wider
scope, applying to wireless and wired traffic. In addition, using
a single multi-class neural network model in GTID requires
full model relearning when one new type is identified while
our “one classifier per type approach” does not.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
A. Support for Legacy Installations
In this work we considered a setting in which the user
introduces new devices to his or her network via the Security
Gateway and device fingerprinting and identification is based
on the characteristic traffic patterns of devices when they are
initially connected to the network. However, we envisage IOT
SENTINEL also to support legacy network installations by
updating a compatible gateway router with Security Gateway
functionality with the necessary fingerprinting and traffic fil-
tering components by means of a software update.
In such cases, fingerprinting and device-type identification
happens after devices have already been connected to the
user’s network. The profiling of devices has therefore to
happen based on the communication behaviour that devices
exhibit during standby (e.g., heartbeat messages to the ven-
dor’s cloud solution), or, during the normal operation of the
device. Our working hypothesis is that similarly as with the
initial setup messages, message exchanges during standby and
operation cycles are likely to be characteristic for particular
device-types and therefore form a good basis for device-type
identification. In future work, we intend to investigate this
approach further to verify its effectiveness.
Legacy network installations often use WPA2-Personal with
a network-specific PSK to authenticate devices to the network.
If there are devices with security vulnerabilities present, it
is possible that the confidentiality of the PSK is breached,
leaking the PSK to an adversary. In order to protect the
user’s IoT devices against a local adversary using a leaked
PSK to infiltrate the user’s network, we need to establish a
virtual network overlay consisting of an untrusted network
representing the existing potentially vulnerable network setup
and a new, trusted network. All devices in the legacy in-
stallation will be initially in the untrusted network. After
performing device-type identification, such devices that do not
have known vulnerabilities will be transferred to the trusted
network by using the re-keying functionality defined by WiFi
Protected Setup (WPS) [43]. For devices supporting WPS re-
keying, it can be triggered by deprecating the legacy network’s
WPA2-Personal PSK, after which the device will trigger a re-
keying exchange to obtain a new WPA2-Personal PSK for the
trusted network overlay. The new PSK provided during re-
keying will be device-specific, in order to allow device-specific
authentication in the trusted network overlay.
For legacy devices that do not support WPS re-keying, there
are two options: 1) WPA2-Personal PSK remains in force: The
device continues to operate in the untrusted network, but is
unable to communicate with devices in the trusted network.
2) WPA2-Personal PSK is deprecated: The device will be
unable to access the user’s network. Manual re-introduction
of the device to the user’s network is required before it can
re-join. The advantage of the former solution is that it does
not impact user experience by disconnecting devices from the
user’s network. However, devices remaining in the untrusted
network are likely more exposed to adversarial attacks. There-
fore, the Security Gateway may optionally prompt the user
(e.g., through its management interface) to re-authenticate such
devices manually. Devices with known security vulnerabilities
will remain in the untrusted network. The trusted and untrusted
networks, however, will be strictly separated from each other.
B. Impact of Software Updates
In this work, we defined a device-type to denote the combi-
nation of a device’s make, model and software version. As in
our set of test devices, however, only a few devices offered the
possibility for a software update during our experimentation
period, we were not able to comprehensively investigate this
capability. For three devices for which updates were applied,
these updates led to generate distinguishable fingerprints be-
tween software versions of these devices. In our future work
we expect to be able to investigate this further, as we expect
over time software updates to become available for a larger
set of the analysed devices.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented IOT SENTINEL, a system for au-
tomatic identification and security enforcement of IoT devices
with potential security vulnerabilities. We propose a novel
approach in which identification is based on profiling of the
device type-specific communication behaviour of individual
devices. Our system provides protection for the user’s network
by enforcing network isolation where communications of
potentially vulnerable devices are strictly controlled, thereby
effectively mitigating security risks related to these devices.
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